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Abstract 
The Protestant Reformation, beginning in 1517, was both a shock to the market for religion and a 
first-order economic shock. We study its impact on the allocation of resources between the religious 
and secular sectors in Germany, collecting data on the allocation of human and physical capital. While 
Protestant reformers aimed to elevate the role of religion, we find that the Reformation produced rapid 
economic secularization. The interaction between religious competition and political economy 
explains the shift in investments in human and fixed capital away from the religious sector. Large 
numbers of monasteries were expropriated during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions. 
This transfer of resources shifted the demand for labor between religious and secular sectors: 
graduates from Protestant universities increasingly entered secular occupations. Consistent with 
forward-looking behavior, students at Protestant universities shifted from the study of theology 
toward secular degrees. The appropriation of resources by secular rulers is also reflected in 
construction: during the Reformation, religious construction declined, particularly in Protestant 
regions, while secular construction increased, especially for administrative purposes. Reallocation was 
not driven by pre-existing economic or cultural differences. 
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1 Introduction
Secularization is a process that has defined the modern, Western world, but its origins are poorly
understood. Many social scientists argue that the Protestant Reformation catalyzed the process
that reduced the role of religion in European culture and society (Weber, 1904/05; Troeltsch, 1906;
Mills, 1959; Berger, 1967).1 Contemporary observers have pointed out the lead taken by Protestant
societies in reducing the presence of religiosity in public life (Ho¨lscher, 2005). Yet very little evi-
dence exists establishing a direct link from the Reformation to secularization, with many scholars
arguing for the importance of intermediate factors such as industrialization, social conflict, or na-
tionalism (McLeod, 1981; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Martin, 2005; Becker and Woessmann, 2013;
Becker et al., 2017). Indeed, it is natural to wonder whether and how a religious revival movement
that increased competition in the market for religion would drive secularization.
In this paper we take an economic approach to studying the impact of the Reformation on sec-
ularization. First, we conceptualize economic secularization as the allocation of resources between
religious and secular uses. Second, we develop a political economy framework to understand the
transmission of a shock from the market for religion to the sectoral allocation of economic activ-
ity. Third, we assemble new, highly disaggregated data on monastery expropriation, the universe
of German university graduates, and construction events by sector (religious and secular) at the
town-by-year level, across over 2,000 German towns. We use these data to examine the realloca-
tion of economic resources between the religious sector—whether Catholic or Protestant—and the
secular sector, in Germany, in the decades following Luther’s posting of his 95 theses in 1517.2 We
document a sharp reallocation of economic activity away from religious uses—not just away from
the Catholic Church—during the Reformation; that is, we observe rapid economic secularization in
a society that at the same time remained deeply suffused with cultural religiosity.
Our political economy framework helps us understand this process. It begins with a central
feature of the Reformation: conflict over the control of resources and jurisdiction between sec-
ular state authorities and the Catholic Church, and the expropriation of monasteries by secular
authorities. The closure of monasteries transmitted a shock to labor markets: labor demanded
by the Catholic Church fell and labor demanded by enriched and empowered secular authori-
1Mills (1959, p. 32) writes, “After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across
the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred.”
2“Religious sector” and “secular sector” are imperfect, but concise, terms for activities in a society that was perme-
ated by religiosity. To be clear, we use the term “religious” to describe actions that were primarily oriented toward
religious observance: for example, the construction of a church; taking a position as a monk or priest; or, the study of
theology, which almost invariably led to a job as a monk, priest, etc. In contrast, we use the term “secular” to describe
actions that were not primarily oriented toward religious observance: for example, constructing a hospital, merchant
hall, or palace; taking a position in a secular lord’s public administration; or studying law. The “secular sector” of the
economy thus included many religious individuals and even involved religious institutions (Catholic and Protestant),
but was oriented toward different immediate aims from the “religious sector”. “Germany”, too, is an anachronistic
term. To be precise, we study the German-speaking lands of the Holy Roman Empire. For concision, we use the term
“Germany” throughout the text.
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ties increased. In turn, returns to investments in human capital specific to church careers fell and
became more uncertain. Shifts in resources—skilled labor, as well as land and physical capital—
toward the secular authorities were then reflected in fixed investments embodying these factors
of production, such as the building of significant urban structures.
We document each component of this process. First, as an indicator of the negative shock to the
Catholic Church and of the resources appropriated by secular lords, we provide evidence on the
closure of monasteries after 1517. Closures were particularly pronounced in regions that adopted
Protestantism. There were no pre-Reformation differential trends in the closure of monasteries be-
tween territories that would eventually become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic,
consistent with the Reformation playing a causal role in driving the decline of monasteries.3
The expropriation of resources belonging to the Catholic Church could have resulted in sim-
ply an intrasectoral transfer of resources from Catholic to Protestant uses—if Protestant rulers had
the same objective function as the Catholic Church and allocated their newly acquired resources
accordingly. The shock to the Catholic Church could even have led to a positive net change in
the size of the religious sector, to the extent that competition improved the quality of religious
services (Iannaccone, 1998; Ekelund et al., 2006). On the other hand, if secular rulers who adopted
Protestantism had objectives that prioritized non-religious activities such as the expansion of pub-
lic administration we would expect intersectoral reallocation. Intersectoral reallocation might also
have been supported by Protestant theology, which aimed to reduce corruption in the religious
sector and to effect a partial disintermediation in the production of salvation, reducing the role of
clerics as religious middlemen, and freeing resources for other uses. We next examine the alloca-
tion of resources between the secular and religious sectors during the Reformation.
We study the market for highly skilled labor, where one can observe how the shock to the
Catholic Church shaped the allocation of human capital. We examine individual-level data on the
career choices of university graduates around the time of the Reformation.4 We show that dur-
ing the Reformation, graduates from Protestant universities shifted toward secular occupations,
and away from religious ones (e.g., becoming city councillors or goldsmiths, rather than priests or
monks).5 We find no pre-Reformation differences in occupational choice trends between univer-
sities that would become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic. Our results reflect the
3The question of why particular territorial lords adopted the Protestant religion is an important one, addressed
in Cantoni (2012), Rubin (2014), and Curuk and Smulders (2016). Our findings of parallel pre-Reformation trends,
in monastery closures, human capital investments, and other economic variables, discussed below, suggest that the
sources of variation in adoption were generally not associated with our outcomes of interest prior to the Reformation.
4The important roles played by human capital elites in European history have been explored by Mokyr (2009);
Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014); Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder (2015); Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2016). We build on their
work by discussing a specific source of variation in university students’ selection into fields of study and careers.
5Particularly in light of Protestant attacks on Catholic Church corruption, this result calls to mind of work by Mur-
phy et al. (1991), who study the allocation of talent between a rent-seeking and productive sector. We focus here on
documenting the reallocation of resources across sectors, leaving the study of efficiency or productivity consequences
to future work.
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transmission of the shock to the market for religion into causal effects on the labor market.6
While the Protestant Reformation was a religious movement, an implication of the labor mar-
ket shock is the reallocation of forward-looking students’ human capital investments away from
church-specific fields, toward secular ones. Indeed, we find that immediately after the start of the
Reformation, individuals at Protestant universities reallocated their human capital investments
away from theology degrees, and toward the study of more general, secular subjects.7 The data
are consistent with the Reformation playing a causal role in driving educational choices: we do
not observe pre-Reformation declines in the study of theology or pre-Reformation differences in
degrees granted between universities that would become Protestant and those that would remain
Catholic.
We finally consider major construction events as summary statistics for the allocation of re-
sources, embodying bundles of land and physical, financial, and human capital. Reflecting the
reallocation of resources toward secular authorities, during the Reformation new construction
events shifted from religious purposes toward secular ones (e.g., from churches to administrative
buildings and lords’ palaces). Figure 1 shows a striking pivot from church sector construction to
secular sector construction precisely at the time of the Reformation. Further analysis finds that this
sectoral reallocation away from church uses occurred differentially more in Protestant territories.
Again, the evidence is consistent with the Reformation playing a causal role: we find no evidence
of a pre-Reformation shift toward secular construction, or of differential pre-Reformation trends
in construction between Catholic and Protestant territories.
The disaggregated nature of our construction data allows us to test competing hypotheses.
One alternative to our proposed political economy mechanism is that what appears to be secular-
ization is a mere relabeling of activities that were simply transferred from Catholic Church juris-
diction to Protestant secular lords. Historically, construction supporting social service provision
is difficult to assign definitively to the religious or secular sectors. However, when we disaggre-
gate secular construction into finer categories, we do not observe a shift in construction for social
service provision. Another alternative is that the apparent secularization reflects the transfer of
spending commitments to religious warfare conducted by secular authorities. However, in our
analysis of finer categories of secular construction, we observe no shift in military construction
through 1600. Our own theory predicts that the reallocation of resources should specifically have
been toward uses favored by secular lords. We find that the increases in secular construction were
predominantly in administrative buildings and lords’ palaces—as the theory predicts.
In assessing whether the Reformation played a causal role in driving sectoral reallocation one
first worries about unobserved differences between eventually-Protestant and Catholic territo-
ries and universities. However, it is unlikely that territory- or university-specific unobservables
6Note that the causal effect of the Reformation on occupation choice reflects both changes in labor supply and
changes in labor demand.
7See Altonji et al. (2012) for a contemporary analysis of how students’ college major choices are affected by expecta-
tions of future labor market outcomes.
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Figure 1: Cumulative number of new construction events in the religious and secular sectors in
Germany. Town-level construction data come from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch and are aggregated
for all of Germany.
explain our findings: we find no evidence that universities or territories that adopted the Refor-
mation looked any different from those that did not before 1517.
Another natural concern is that time-varying and territory-specific unobservables may have
driven both the adoption of Protestantism and economic secularization. A large literature doc-
uments a wave of urban support for the Reformation and that cities were key locations where
reformist ideas and constituencies developed (Ozment, 1975; Hamm, 1994). One might wonder
whether cities at the leading edge of the Reformation drive our findings. However, we find vir-
tually identical results when we limit our analysis to small towns. Another possibility is that
changes in economic conditions drove both the adoption of Protestantism and secularization. To
explore this possibility, we examine a set of territories where the timing of adoption was plausi-
bly exogenous—due to unanticipated changes in rulers. We find that within this set of territorial
religious changes that were independent of underlying economic conditions, the same pattern of
economic secularization ensues.
Our findings contribute to a larger political economy literature on modernization, much of
which has focused on the rise of democratic political institutions or the emergence of modern
economic growth.8 Our work documents another important historical dimension of moderniza-
8Among others, see Lipset (1959), Barro (1999), Galor and Weil (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Mokyr (2005), Clark
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tion: the secularization of Western society, a component of E´mile Durkheim’s “functional differ-
entiation” (Durkheim, 1893, 1912). Durkheim argued that the transfer of tasks once carried out
exclusively by the Church (through monasteries, churches, cathedral schools etc.) to specialized
professionals and organizations was a fundamentally important process in Western history. We
provide quantitative, microeconometric evidence of this process, and point to the Reformation as
playing a key role in initiating it.
Our analysis also contributes to the large literature on the economic consequences of religion
and culture (e.g., Barro and McCleary, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Guiso et al., 2006; Kuran,
2011), and more specifically to the growing body of quantitative empirical work on the impact of
the Reformation on economic outcomes in Europe. Becker et al. (2016) present a comprehensive
review of this literature, discussing studies of the Reformation’s effects on human capital acqui-
sition (e.g., Becker and Woessmann, 2008, 2009; Boppart et al., 2013); work ethic (e.g., Basten and
Betz, 2013; Spenkuch, 2016); and, economic development (e.g., Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Can-
toni, 2015; Heldring et al., 2015; Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016). As Becker et al. (2016) observe,
existing work typically studies effects over the long run, with outcomes observed in the 19th, 20th,
and even 21st centuries.9
Our work complements the existing empirical work on the Reformation by treating it as a
sector-specific macroeconomic shock, and examining its short- and medium-run effects on the
allocation of resources between religious and secular uses.10 It thereby complements a large con-
temporary literature on sectoral shocks and the allocation of economic inputs, particularly labor
(e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001; Autor et al., 2016; Charles et al., 2016a,b). Our finding of eco-
nomic secularization—distinct from cultural, social, or even political secularization—following the
Reformation can reconcile views of a Reformed Europe that was both extremely religious, and also
on the path toward secularization (e.g., Saint-Simon, 1975; Berger, 1967; Taylor, 2007).11
In what follows, we first, in Section 2, present a historical overview of the Reformation viewed
through a framework linking religion to Europe’s political economy and labor markets. Next,
in Section 3, we describe the datasets that we constructed to study the Reformation’s economic
consequences. In Section 4, we document the reallocation of resources between the religious and
secular sectors. Finally, in Section 5 we offer concluding thoughts.
(2007), Acemoglu et al. (2009), Allen (2009), Mokyr (2009).
9Exceptions include Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2016), who study human capital responses to institutional change in
the short run, and Cantoni (2015), who studies consequences for growth in the early modern era.
10In examining the impact of religious shocks on the allocation of resources within a society, our work is closely
related to that of Chaney (2008, 2013), but examining a different context, and exploiting more disaggregated data along
multiple margins. See also Paldam and Paldam (2017) for a study of church construction over time in Denmark.
11Summarizing these positions, Gorski (2000) points out the apparent paradox of a religious movement that, at the
same time, broke the authority of a monopolistic church and yet introduced tight links between the new churches
and states: “differentiation—-the breakup of the Roman Church and the emergence of the great confessions—was
accompanied by de-differentiation—tighter links between church and state and closer cooperation between clergy and
laity” (p. 158).
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2 Historical background and conceptual framework
We view the Reformation as a shock to the market for religion, which precipitated economic sec-
ularization. In this section, we place the Reformation in its historical context and describe the
ramifications of the religious shock for Europe’s political economy and labor markets. Here we
describe these historical processes at work. We provide a brief timeline of the Reformation’s major
events in Germany in Table 1.
Table 1: Timeline of Major Reformation Events, 1517–1648
Date Event
1517 Luther posts 95 theses in Wittenberg
1521 Edict of Worms condemns Luther as a heretic
1522 First formal Protestant ordinances passed
1524–1525 Great Peasants’ War
1546–1547 Schmalkaldic War
1555 Peace of Augsburg establishes cuius regio, eius religio principle
1618–1648 30 Years’ War
2.1 The Reformation as a shock to the market for religion
At the start of the 16th century, just prior to the Reformation, the Catholic Church enjoyed a virtual
monopoly in the market for religion in Western Europe and extraordinary wealth and power (the
foundation stone of St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome was laid in 1506). The Church functioned as an
expensive intermediary between lay people and the divine, with services conducted in Latin and
substantial resources devoted to supporting specialist clerics (Cameron, 1991).
In October 1517, Martin Luther posted his famous 95 theses critiquing Church practices. Luther’s
critiques focused on the corruption of the Catholic Church, particularly the sale of “indulgences,”
which believers purchased to secure early release from purgatory. While Luther did not set out to
challenge the religious monopoly of the Catholic Church, a clear break between the Church and
Luther emerged in 1521, when the Edict of Worms condemned him as a heretic. The emergence of
the Protestant Reformation as a movement that challenged the Catholic Church was possible for
two reasons: first, Luther and his supporters were able to disseminate their ideas widely, rapidly,
and relatively cheaply using the newly invented printing press (Rubin, 2014; Dittmar and Seabold,
2016). Second, politically active laymen adopted and adapted reformist ideas and pressed them
on governing elites (Cameron, 1991).
The reformers argued that biblical authority was paramount over and above the authority of
existing church institutions, called for moral renewal within cities, and were often anti-clerical and
anti-monastic (Moeller, 1972; Dykema and Oberman, 1993). Protestants argued for and began to
6
implement a program that included the abolition of the Catholic rite mass, the establishment of
safeguards against church corruption, and increased public goods provision in health and educa-
tion (Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016). The impact of the movement was seen quickly, with the first
local ordinances enshrining elements of Protestant ideology in city laws passed in 1522.12
The reform movement also inspired more radical action, inflaming the Great Peasants’ War
of 1524–1525 (Blickle, 1981). A declaration from the period captures the popular spirit of anti-
monasticism of the time (Cohn, 1979, p. 28): “It is well known and clear to all that everywhere
there are too many monasteries, and that they unashamedly claim to be outside the world, and
yet together with the large foundations they even bring into their own possession all the goods of
the world . . . we have considered together and decided to tolerate no monastery any longer, but
to close them.”
2.2 The Reformation as a political economy shock
In the first years after 1517, cities were the main actors behind the movement to reform the Church,
with the territorial lords remaining more cautious. However, this changed over the course of the
1520s. The Reformation provided an important opening for renegotiating the balance of power
between the Catholic Church and secular lords. Our empirical analysis below shows that princes
who turned to Protestantism filled the void left by the Church—a near-monopolistic provider of
spiritual, educational, and social welfare services—by reallocating physical and human capital to
a secular, state-run administration.
Leveraging the anti-monasticism of the Protestant movement to acquire property and power
was a natural temptation for secular princes. Ocker (2010, p. 62) writes, “Monasticism is relevant
. . . for the simple reason that monasteries were landholders, sometimes very great landholders,
and hence they fragmented the dominions of the European historian’s much-anticipated confes-
sional states.” Some monasteries voluntarily closed for ideological reasons and princes expropri-
ated others in the name of religious duty: “Princes like Philip of Hesse, whose confiscations in
1527 set an early benchmark for evangelical church-plundering, defended their actions as defense
of religion, as protecting the church from the malpractice of priests, monks, and nuns” (Ocker,
2010, p. 62; see also Ocker, 2006).
The Reformation provided an opportunity for secular rulers to strengthen their fiscal posi-
tions as well. Prior to the Reformation, religious orders enjoyed exemption from taxes and civic
duties, monopolies on priced religious services (e.g., funeral services) and on the production of
products like beer. Whether in the name of populism or religious duty, many princes saw an op-
portunity to enhance their political and economic positions as a result of the Reformation. It is
12Cities and urban actors played a central role in the development and diffusion of Reformation ideas and institu-
tions (Moeller, 1972; Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016). Cities contained the necessary concentrations of people, levels of
literacy, and cultural sophistication to put the ideas of religious reformers on the political agenda in the 1520s (Brady,
1998; Ozment, 1975).
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worth noting that the shifting of the balance of power was not exclusive to territories that adopted
Protestantism: rulers who remained Catholic, too, were able to strike better bargains with the
Church under the threat of conversion (Cameron, 1991).
In Germany, the Reformation produced considerable heterogeneity in religion across territo-
ries, with many princes, as well the Holy Roman Emperor, remaining Catholic. Conflict between
princes who adopted Protestantism and those who remained Catholic reached a climax in the
1540s, with the establishment of the Schmalkaldic League of Protestant princes, and the Schmal-
kaldic War of 1546–1547. While the Protestant princes were defeated in the war, Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V was unable to re-establish a single faith across the Empire. In 1555 the Peace
of Augsburg was agreed to, setting the rule cuius regio, euis religio (whose rule, his religion), al-
lowing territorial lords to adopt either Catholicism or Lutheranism for their territories. Thus, by
the mid-1500s, Protestantism in Germany acquired the geographic distribution it would maintain
for several centuries (Brady, 1998, p. 373), though the 30 Years’ War of 1618–1648 represented a
cataclysmic upheaval a half century after the Peace of Augsburg.
The new political economic equilibrium was quite different from the old, with secular rulers
strengthened, particularly in those territories that adopted Protestantism. The Peace of Augsburg
provided, for over half a century, a reliable legal setting that allowed for the implementation of the
Reformation and the creation of state churches in the territories that converted. As Luther himself
wrote (cited in Brady, 2009, p. 260):
If I, Dr. Martin Luther, had never taught or done anything else than to illuminate secu-
lar government or authority and make it attractive, for this one deed the rulers should
thank me. . . . Since the Apostles’ time no theologian or jurist has more splendidly
and clearly confirmed, instructed, and comforted the temporal rulers than I, by special
divine grace, was able to do.13
2.3 The Reformation as a labor market shock
The Reformation’s direct political economy effects—strengthening secular rulers, weakening the
Catholic Church, and instigating a wave of monastery expropriations and closures—had indirect
effects on the market for skilled labor. One can think about this in terms of stocks and flows. Re-
garding stocks, prior to the Reformation, the Catholic Church was Germany’s largest employer of
university graduates. Among German university students before 1550, over 65 percent of grad-
uates pursued in careers in the Church. Data in Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008)
suggest the existence of over 80,000 monks in Germany just prior to the Reformation—over 1%
13Note that Lutherans would not have seen a contradiction in their religious movement strengthening secular lords.
Luther’s “Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Governments” distinguished between two distinct realms of
governance: the institution-free realm of “the word,” between Christ and the believer’s soul, and the “realm of the
world,” which operated “through visible structures, published rules, and coercive force” (Cameron, 1991, p. 180).
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of the German population at the time—with two thirds of them released into the broader labor
market by monastery closure in the decades following 1517.14
Flows of highly skilled labor entering the labor force would likely have been redirected as well.
Prior to the Reformation, the most common first occupation among German university graduates
was employment as a monk. Monastery closure and a shift in economic power away from the
Catholic Church reduced labor demand and increased uncertainty in the most important sector
of employment for the newly graduated. There was a supply-side effect of the Reformation as
well: Ocker (2010, p. 62) writes, “The new faith rebutted the most compelling reason to become
a monk or a nun—to save one’s soul and the souls of others. This rebuttal coincided with, and
surely abetted, widespread attrition in monasteries.”
Secular princes’ increased power and resources meant that the path from higher education
into secular employment was increasingly appealing. An ordinance from Wu¨rttemberg from 1546
notes that “Men are needed to serve in preaching offices, governments, temporal posts, [and]
administrative offices” (Strauss, 1988). Luther himself wrote about the importance of high levels
of education for state service: “[The common man should be able to read in German at home.] But
to preach, to rule, to judge, . . . all arts and languages of the world are not enough” (cited in Seifert,
1996, p. 257).
Reflecting their increased demand for skilled labor, princes provided support for investments
in university education.15 In 1527 Landgrave Philipp of Hesse, after establishing a new univer-
sity in Marburg, also decided to provide students with stipends, financed through the revenues
derived from former Church property (Seifert, 1996, pp. 271–272). Thus, shifts in labor market
demand and supply seem to have pushed human capital away from church-sector employment
and toward secular employment—we will examine this in further detail below.
2.4 The Reformation and resource reallocation
Cameron (1991, p. 159) writes that, “For laypeople, the point about the Reformation was that it
abolished the expensive and complicated apparatus to which they had resorted so regularly for the
good of their souls.” The abolition of this apparatus in parts of Germany freed resources for uses
other than salvation. Secular lords acquired and had the opportunity to reallocate large shares of
the land, capital, and skilled labor that were previously allocated to spiritual purposes. Flows of
skilled labor changed as well, reflecting demand- and supply-side effects of the Reformation. Our
empirical analysis examines the consequences of these political economy and labor market shocks
to the sectoral allocation of skilled labor and fixed capital.
14We describe the sources of these data in more detail below, in Section 3.
15University degrees initially fell dramatically following 1517, as students left the universities to follow preachers
and join the new religious movements. This can be seen in the degree data presented below, and is discussed in more
detail in Seifert (1996). University attendance increased only with the institutionalization of the Reformation in later
years, and the formal support provided by princes.
9
3 Data
Our analysis is focused on three sets of data: (i) monastery closures across Germany over time,
reflecting the shock to the market for religion and the expropriation of resources by secular lords;
(ii) German university graduates’ degrees and careers, reflecting labor market consequences of
the Reformation; and, (iii) construction activity across Germany over time, reflecting the alloca-
tion of human and physical capital in fixed investments. In this section, we describe the sources
from which these data are drawn in turn. We also discuss the corresponding assignment of units
of analysis to religious categories. We will assign territories, cities, and/or universities that re-
mained Catholic throughout the period of analysis to the category “Catholic”; similarly, we assign
territories, cities, and/or universities that would eventually adopt Protestantism to the category
“Protestant.”16
3.1 Monastery presence
We gather data on 3,094 monasteries described in Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008).
For each monastery, we collect data on its precise location, date of foundation, and date of closure,
if applicable.17 In Figure 2, we present a map of the monasteries open in the German lands of the
Holy Roman Empire in the 16th century, highlighting those that closed during the 16th century.
We also present the time series pattern of monastery closure in Figure 3.
Our analysis of monasteries, like our study of construction events, is oriented around the over
2,200 towns contained in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, an encyclopedic source of information on each
German town’s history.18 For every town, we calculate the number of monasteries in existence
in 1517 within 25 kilometers, as well as the number and share of these monasteries that were
closed between 1517 and 1600. To go beyond time-series variation, we exploit cross-sectional
variation in territorial religion. We assign each town in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch to territorial lords
following the territorial mapping provided by Nu¨ssli (2008) for the year 1500 and code the religion
of territorial lords using Cantoni (2012).19 Because not every city can be assigned a religion using
16Note that the adoption of Protestantism was almost always an absorbing state.
17The data include both monasteries and convents, and we use the term “monasteries” as a short-hand. Closure
dates are directly coded from Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008). For over 67 percent of monasteries,
Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008) provide information on foundations dates. For the remaining monas-
teries, we first gather evidence on initial monastery construction by order and location from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
We identify the foundation dates of any residual monasteries from territorial archives. For example, for monasteries in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg we review the databank “Klo¨ster in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg” maintained by the Landesarchiv Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg (the State Archive) at https://www.kloester-bw.de/index.php. We then cross-check against individual
monastery entries on www.wikipedia.de. In total, we identify foundation dates for 3,085 of 3,094 monasteries.
18We use “town” to describe the generic entry in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, as the modal location was small. But it is
worth noting that the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch covers, and our data include, all incorporated units of Germany, including
large cities.
19Jurisdiction in early modern Germany involved fluid and overlapping claims among authorities. We thus view
the Euratlas region as a proxy for actual jurisdiction over the time period we study. Another complication is posed
by the existence of a small number of “free cities” that are not subject to a territorial lord. Most of these free cities are
10
Figure 2: Map of all monasteries in Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008). White circles
indicate monasteries that remain open throughout the time period under study. Black triangles
indicate monasteries that were opened prior to the Reformation but closed between 1517 and 1600.
Territorial boundaries come from Nu¨ssli (2008).
this mapping, as a robustness check, we directly code the religion of as many towns as possible
using hand-collected evidence from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, and find very similar results.
3.2 University graduates and their careers
Our main source of information on German university graduates is the Repertorium Academicum
Germanicum (Schwinges and Hesse, 2015), a research program (and online database) developed
by historians at the Universities of Berne and Giessen, collecting information on the universe of
recipients of academic degrees from German universities until 1550. The German universities are:
Basel, Erfurt, Frankfurt (an der Oder), Freiburg, Greifswald, Heidelberg, Ingolstadt, Ko¨ln, Leipzig,
dropped from our analysis, and our results are robust to excluding them entirely. A complete list of territories and their
(eventual) religion can be found in the Online Appendix, Table A2.
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Figure 3: Number of monasteries and convents closing in each year. Closure dates are from
Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008).
Mainz, Marburg, Rostock, Trier, Tu¨bingen, Wittenberg, and Wu¨rzburg.20
Schwinges and Hesse (2015), which we refer to as “RAG” henceforth, collects information on
each degree recipient’s degree subject(s) and year(s) from university registry sources. The degrees
granted include bachelor’s degrees, licenses, master’s degrees, and doctorate degrees. They were
granted by one of the four traditional faculties that universities of the time featured: arts, law,
medicine, and theology. We classify degrees in arts, law, and medicine as “secular” to distinguish
them from more church sector-specific training in theology (evidence on career paths associated
with degrees in different fields is provided in Section 4.3, below).
To measure post-1550 human capital investments, in particular after the Schmalkaldic War
(1546) and the Peace of Augsburg (1555), we hand collect data on university degrees granted by
the German universities included in the RAG dataset between 1540 and 1600, consulting Bauch
(1897); Erler (1895, 1897, 1909); Eulenburg (1904); Kleineidam (1983); Leinweber (1991); Ru¨egg
(1996); Steinmeyer (1912).21
In Figure 4, we show the number of theology degrees and “secular” degrees over time, from
1475–1600. One can see that after the Reformation, the number of degrees granted falls for all
fields initially; the number of secular degrees recovers by the late 1500s, while the level of theology
degrees remains low throughout the remainder of the 16th century.22
In addition to information on degrees received, the RAG database contains information on
20Note that we do not consider in our analysis universities attended by Germans outside of the borders of modern
Germany, such as Louvain or Prague; nor do we include several small universities opened after 1550, such as Jena.
Basel joined the Swiss Confederation only during the period of our study.
21We collect data from 1540–1550 in order to compare across data sources using the decade of overlap between 1540
and 1550. Our data and the RAG data closely match. One can see in Online Appendix Figure A1 that the patterns we
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Figure 4: Number of theology and secular degrees granted (yearly data and 11-year moving av-
erage). Theology and secular (arts, law, and medicine) degree categories are exhaustive and mu-
tually exclusive. Data come from the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum for degrees granted
through 1550 and own data collection (consulting Bauch, 1897; Erler, 1895, 1897, 1909; Eulenburg,
1904; Kleineidam, 1983; Leinweber, 1991; Ru¨egg, 1996; Steinmeyer, 1912) for degrees granted from
1550 through 1600.
careers for 5,102 of 14,704 students receiving degrees between 1470 and 1550. The RAG provides
over 400 different occupational titles in its database. For example, the top ten occupations in terms
of frequency are: Professor, Kanoniker (Canon), Domherr (Canon, typically receiving a stipend),
Dekan (Deacon), Kleriker (Priest), Rektor (Rector), Pfarrer (Pastor, typically at the parish level),
Priester (Priest), Mo¨nch (Monk), Propst (Provost or superior). Other occupations include judges,
bakers, guild masters, mayors, city councillors, teachers, headmasters, goldsmiths, writers and
orators. We divide the occupations into two categories: “church” (including priests, monks, etc.)
and “secular” (including professors, judges, mayors, etc.). Many of the occupation titles are ar-
chaic; we thus rely on the Thesaurus Professionum Forschungsstelle fu¨r Personalschriften (Marburg,
2015), which categorizes historic occupations into seven one-digit categories with subcategories.
observe are not at all driven by smoothing across sources.
22The numbers of degrees granted by level and by individual subject can be seen in Table A1 in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 5: Number of German universities (total/Protestant only) within our sample. Adoption of
Protestantism is coded based on Sehling (1902-2013), Spitz (1981), Grendler (2004), and Naragon
(2006).
Below, we will examine the heterogeneous effects of the Reformation on degrees granted and
occupations selected into depending on the denomination of the university at which an individual
studied. We rely on Sehling (1902-2013), Spitz (1981), Grendler (2004), Naragon (2006) to identify
the universities that adopted Protestantism: Basel, Erfurt, Frankfurt an der Oder, Greifswald, Hei-
delberg, Leipzig, Marburg, Rostock, Tu¨bingen, and Wittenberg.23 In Figure 5 we show the time
series of the number of German universities as well as the number that adopted Protestantism.
One can see in the figure that there was a sharp increase in the number of Protestant universities
between 1520 and 1550.24
3.3 Construction events
We hand-coded approximately 27,000 unique, major construction “events” at the town level, de-
scribed in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Each town’s entry in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch includes a section
(section 5) titled, “Die Stadt als Siedlung” (“The City as Settlement”) within which exists a sub-
category (5b) titled, “Markante Gebaude” (“Notable/Important Construction”). We plot the time
23Note that Erfurt university became Lutheran in 1521 and returned to Catholicism in 1530s. Thus, we treat Erfurt as
a Catholic university.
24It is important to note that the adoption of Protestantism was rarely a discrete event, as we treat it here for conve-
nience (see Spitz, 1981 and Seifert, 1996).
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Figure 6: Number of new construction events in Germany (yearly counts and 11-year moving
average). Data come from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
series of new construction events across Germany (the raw data and an 11-year moving average)
between 1475 and 1600 in Figure 6, and one can see an average of 25–35 new events per year. In the
figure we mark both the date when Luther posted his 95 theses (1517) and the data of the Peace of
Augsburg (1555), which greatly reduced political instability. One can see that following the Peace
of Augsburg there was, indeed, an increase in construction activity.
We code each construction event by start date and sector.25 We assign the finely detailed con-
struction events to “church construction” (e.g., churches or monasteries) and “secular construc-
tion” (e.g., town halls, bridges, malls, palaces, or schools) and examine these broad categories in
much of our analysis; we examine more disaggregated categories of construction below, in Sec-
tion 4.4.26 Construction events are linked to Protestant or Catholic regions based on the town of
the event. We assign towns to lords following the territorial mapping provided by Nu¨ssli (2008)
25Not all construction events are associated with a precise year. For the purposes of our research here, we limit the
analysis to those construction events with clearly-specified first years (i.e., “construction starts”). Note, too, that any
potential differences in the original collection of data across volumes of the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch will be accounted for
in panel regressions with fixed effects.
26As noted above, we make a sharp distinction between the “church” or religious sector and the secular sector, when
in practice there was certainly a grey area between the two. We do believe that our coding is generally accurate; for
example, schools served both religious and secular purposes, but as Strauss (1988, p. 193) notes, post-Reformation
compulsory schooling laws “placed the supervision of all educational institutions firmly in the hands of princes and
magistrates, who were the owners and wielders of the instruments of public power.”
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and use information on the religion of territorial lords from Cantoni (2012), as described above.
4 Empirical analysis
We begin our empirical analysis by documenting patterns of monastery closure, which provide
evidence of resource expropriation by secular authorities from the Catholic Church, and represent
the first step of the political economy mechanism we outlined above. We next consider the con-
sequences of the religious market and political economy shocks for the labor market, examining
the reallocation of human capital from church to secular uses. Finally, we analyze construction
activity, which we see as a summary statistic for the allocation of economic inputs toward secular
or church purposes.
4.1 Monastery closure
Monasteries were ubiquitous in early modern Germany, with the average town having nearly
8 monasteries within 25 kilometers (a single day’s walk) on the eve of the Reformation. These
monasteries represented an immense stock of land, wealth, and human capital; the expropriation
of monasteries during the Reformation thus marked a dramatic shock to the church sector (and
the Catholic Church in particular). In most cases, expropriated property was taken by secular
authorities.
To provide a sense of the pattern of monastery presence and closure around the time of the
Reformation, in Figure 7, we plot the average number of monasteries within 25 kilometers of
towns that would become Protestant and towns that would remain Catholic, respectively. One
can see in the figure that prior to 1517, the average number of monasteries proximate to towns was
quite steady. The number of monasteries near towns that would remain Catholic was somewhat
higher than near towns that would become Protestant, a fact that can be explained by the location
of Catholic cities—more likely to be in the “older,” southern and western parts of the Empire.
Importantly, however, trends are very similar in the two sets of towns prior to 1517.
Figure 7 shows that following the posting of Luther’s 95 theses in 1517, the density of monas-
teries declined across Germany, but with important heterogeneity across territories. In towns
whose territorial lords eventually adopted Protestantism, there were only three monasteries within
25 kilometers in 1550, and only two in 1600—this represents a reduction of over two-thirds. In
towns whose lords remained Catholic, there was a smaller decline in monastery presence, from
nine within 25 kilometers in 1517 to around seven in 1600.
In Table 2, we examine these patterns in a regression framework, studying variation across
decades in the number of monasteries within 25 kilometers of a town, with the unit of observation
the town×decade. Specifically, we estimate:
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Figure 7: Average number of monasteries within 25 km of towns included in the Deutsches
Sta¨dtebuch. Assignment of towns to religious denominations is done by matching each town to
its territorial lord identified in the Euratlas for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as
coded by Cantoni (2012).
monasteriesit = αi + δt +
1590
∑
τ=1470
βτ(proti × decadeτ) + eit, (1)
where monasteriesit is the number of monasteries in town i in decade t; αi are a full set of town
fixed effects; δt are a full set of decade fixed effects, and the explanatory variables of interest are the
interactions between decade fixed effects and an “eventually Protestant town” dummy variable
(1510–1519, just prior to the Reformation, is the omitted reference decade).
In Table 2, column 1, we present coefficient estimates from this baseline specification, and one
can see results consistent with Figure 7: prior to 1520, there is no difference in the number of
monasteries between eventually Protestant towns and towns that would remain Catholic (even
accounting for fixed effects, as in the regression setup). Nor is there is any evidence of a trend
toward fewer monasteries near eventually Protestant places, as evidenced by the coefficients re-
lating to the interaction terms of “Protestant” and the pre-1517 decade dummies. One can also
see a significant relative decline in monasteries near eventually-Protestant towns after 1517. The
decline opens in the 1520s, and expands into the late 16th century. The magnitude of the effect, as
suggested by Figure 7 is large: beyond the decline in monasteries near Catholic towns, Protestant
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Table 2: The Effect of the Reformation on Monasteries
Dependent variable: Number of monasteries within 25km of a town
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protestant × 1470 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.01 0.09
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12)
Protestant × 1480 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Protestant × 1490 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Protestant × 1500 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Protestant × 1520 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35 -0.15 -0.42 -0.26
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13)
Protestant × 1530 -1.32 -1.33 -1.31 -0.75 -1.54 -1.13
(0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.38)
Protestant × 1540 -2.51 -2.53 -2.49 -1.59 -2.85 -2.16
(0.80) (0.81) (0.79) (0.71) (0.87) (0.57)
Protestant × 1550 -3.01 -3.03 -3.00 -1.98 -3.41 -2.66
(0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.78) (0.95) (0.60)
Protestant × 1560 -3.26 -3.28 -3.26 -2.10 -3.73 -2.91
(0.86) (0.87) (0.85) (0.81) (1.00) (0.59)
Protestant × 1570 -3.45 -3.47 -3.45 -2.16 -4.00 -3.12
(0.87) (0.88) (0.87) (0.87) (1.02) (0.58)
Protestant × 1580 -3.45 -3.48 -3.46 -2.12 -4.03 -3.14
(0.89) (0.90) (0.88) (0.94) (0.98) (0.54)
Protestant × 1590 -3.55 -3.58 -3.56 -2.21 -4.15 -3.27
(0.89) (0.90) (0.88) (0.94) (1.01) (0.58)
Observations 20033 20033 20033 20033 20033 20033
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96
1400–1470 constr.×decade FE N Y N N N Y
1470 cumul. markets×decade FE N N Y N N Y
1460–1469 univ. grads×decade FE N N N Y N Y
1470 monastery stock×decade FE N N N N Y Y
Table presents differential numbers of monasteries within 25 kilometers of a town, comparing towns
in territories that would become Protestant and towns in territories that would remain Catholic, by
decade (i.e., interactions between an “eventually protestant town” dummy variable and decade fixed
effects). The omitted category is Protestant×1510. The unit of observation is the town×decade, with
the outcome variable calculated as the average number of monasteries open within 25 kilometers
of a town in a particular decade. All regressions include town and decade fixed effects. Column 2
includes interactions between the total number of construction events in a town between 1400–1470
and decade fixed effects. Column 3 includes interactions between the cumulative number of market
grants in a city as of 1470 and decade fixed effects. Column 4 includes interactions between the total
number of students receiving degrees between 1460–1469 from universities within 150 kilometers of a
city and decade fixed effects. Column 5 includes interactions between the total number of monasteries
within 25 kilometers of a city in the year 1500 and decade fixed effects. Column 6 includes all controls
in columns 2–5. Standard errors clustered at the territory level in parentheses (35 clusters). Mean of
the dependent variable (pre-Reformation): 7.74.
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towns experienced an additional three closed monasteries by the end of the 16th century.
Of course, cities that would become Protestant differed from cities that would remain Catholic
along many dimensions. While city-specific, time-invariant characteristics are accounted for by
the full set of town fixed effects in the regression, we consider the possibility that post-1520 di-
vergences in the presence of monasteries reflect differences due to city characteristics other than
the adoption of Protestantism per se. In Table 2, columns 2 and 3, we examine whether pre-
Reformation economic differences may account for part of the post-1520 differential decline in
monasteries near eventually-Protestant towns. In column 2, we include as controls interactions
between the total number of construction events in a town between 1400 and 1470 and decade
fixed effects. These controls have almost no effect on the estimated coefficients on interactions
between the decade fixed effects and the “eventually Protestant town” dummy variable. In col-
umn 3, we include as controls interactions between the cumulative number of markets granted to
a city as of 1470 and decade fixed effects.27 Again, our main results are practically unaffected.
Another concern is that pre-existing differences in human capital may have shaped both the
evolution of the Reformation and the closure of monasteries in a region. We thus, in Table 2,
column 4, control for interactions between decade fixed effects and the total number of students
receiving degrees from universities within 150 kilometers of a town in the 1460s (just prior to
the start of our analysis). Accounting for human capital differences across towns (and allowing
these differences to have decade-varying effects) has some effect on the estimated differences in
monastery closure between Protestant and Catholic towns, but we still see a significant divergence
during the Reformation, opening up in the 1540s.
A final issue is that the existing monasteries in a region themselves may have shaped both the
evolution of the Reformation and the process of monastery closure. In Table 2, column 5, we thus
control for the interaction of decade fixed effects and the total number of monasteries within 25
kilometers of a city in the year 1470. One can see that allowing initial stocks of monasteries to
have time varying effects on post-Reformation closure of monasteries does not affect our results.
Finally, in Table 2, column 6, we include all of the interactions included in columns 2–5, and
our results remain qualitatively unchanged: towns that eventually became Protestant experienced
significantly more monastery closure than Catholic towns, even accounting for the time varying
effects of initial economic, human capital, and monastery stock differences.
Monastery closure not only represented a direct shift of resources from the Church to secular
lords—it was also a massive shock to the early modern high-skilled labor market. With two-thirds
of monasteries closing in Protestant territories, a substantial fraction of the most common first
job of university graduates—namely, becoming a monk—disappeared in the 16th century. Not
only did labor demand in the “religious sector” fall, but labor supply to the religious sector may
also have declined—because of increased uncertainty regarding church employment, and because
27The data on market grants to a city come from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch (see Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2014, for
details).
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Figure 8: Shares of first job “monk” by (eventual) university denomination. Figure shows the share
of first job “monk” among individuals with occupations listed in the Repertorium Academicum Ger-
manicum, by an individual’s year of first university degree attainment and by the degree-granting
university’s eventual denomination (smoothed using an 11-year moving average).
expropriated resources and greater administrative power among secular lords increased the de-
mand for skilled labor in the “secular” sector. We thus turn next to differences in the occupational
choices and human capital investments made by highly-skilled workers.
4.2 Occupational choice
We begin our analysis of the allocation of highly-skilled labor by examining the choice most di-
rectly affected by the Reformation and the consequent expropriation of monasteries: selection by
the highly-skilled into becoming a monk. In Figure 8, we plot the share of university graduates in
the RAG dataset whose first job is “monk”; we plot one series for individuals whose first univer-
sity degree was earned at a university that would become Protestant during the Reformation and
another series for individuals whose first university degree was earned at a university that would
remain Catholic.
One can see in the figure that prior to the Reformation, universities that would become Protes-
tant and those that would remain Catholic produced graduates that selected into becoming monks
in similar shares: around 5–10% of students in both types of universities had first jobs as monks.
Immediately after the Reformation, however, graduates of universities that would adopt Protes-
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tantism became far less likely to have first jobs as monks, with the share dropping to zero in the
1540s. Among graduates of universities that would remain Catholic, we see no change in the frac-
tion of graduates with first jobs as monks after the Reformation, and if anything the share slightly
increases. It is worth noting that there is no evidence that the universities that would become
Protestant were trending away from the others: the shares of graduates with first jobs as monks
are broadly stable among the two groups of university graduates prior to 1517 (if anything, we
observe a slight increase of graduates becoming monks close to 1517 among the universities that
would later become Protestant).
We next test for differences in shares of graduates with first jobs as monks across universities,
decade by decade, in a regression framework with the unit of analysis the university×decade. Of
interest to us is whether the share of university graduates from universities that would adopt the
Protestant religion differentially sort into first jobs as monks. Thus, we regress the share of gradu-
ates with first jobs as monks from a given university in a given decade on interactions between an
“eventually protestant university” dummy variable and decade fixed effects (the omitted decade
is 1510–1519).28
Specifically, we estimate:
shareut = αu + δt +
1540
∑
τ=1470
βτ(protu × decadeτ) + eut, (2)
where shareut is the share of graduates from university u in decade t whose first occupation indi-
cated in the RAG database is “monk”. The αu terms are a full set of university fixed effects; δt are
a full set of decade fixed effects, and the explanatory variables of interest are the interactions be-
tween decade fixed effects and an “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable (1510–1519,
just prior to the Reformation, is the omitted reference decade).
We present estimates from this specification in Table 3. The results in column 1 precisely match
what was seen in Figure 8: prior to the Reformation, shares of graduates with first jobs as monks
are not following different trends in universities that would eventually become Protestant com-
pared to those that would remain Catholic. However, after the Reformation, particularly in the
1530s and 1540s, a significantly smaller share of Protestant university graduates have a first job as
monks. Moreover, the sum of the post-Reformation interaction coefficients is significantly differ-
ent from zero (p-value is 0.00).
We next attempt to account for differences across universities other than their eventual reli-
gious affiliations that might also affect the sorting of their graduates into careers. Because labor
market opportunities might vary across space (particularly along the East-West gradient), and
differentially so over time (thus affecting labor market outcomes of local university graduates),
28Because several universities have very small numbers of graduates in particular decades, we weight observa-
tions by the number of degrees in a university×decade cell. Alternatively, we can aggregate data to the “Protestant
university”×decade level and our results are qualitatively identical.
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Table 3: The Effect of the Reformation on the Share of First Jobs as Monks
Dependent variable: Share of first jobs as monks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protestant × 1470 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Protestant × 1480 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Protestant × 1490 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Protestant × 1500 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Protestant × 1520 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Protestant × 1530 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Protestant × 1540 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.49
p-value: sum of 1520–1540 interactions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Longitude×time N Y N Y
Univ. foundation date×time N N Y Y
Table presents differential first occupational shares as monks between grad-
uates from universities that would become Protestant and graduates from
universities that would remain Catholic, by decade (i.e., interactions between
an “eventually protestant university” dummy variable and decade fixed ef-
fects). The omitted category is Protestant×1510. The unit of observation is
the university×decade. All regressions weight by the number of degrees in a
university×decade cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns
include decade and university fixed effects. Column 2 controls for linear
time trends that vary with the university’s longitude; column 3 controls for
university foundation date-varying linear time trends; and, column 4 con-
trols for both longitude-varying linear time trends and university foundation
date-varying linear time trends. The bottom row of the table presents the p-
value from a test that the sum of the coefficients on the interactions between
the “eventually protestant university” dummy variable and 1520, 1530, and
1540 decade fixed effects equals zero. Mean of the dependent variable (pre-
Reformation): 0.06.
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Figure 9: Shares of first job by sector by (eventual) university denomination. Figure shows the
share of first jobs in secular and religious economic sectors among individuals with occupations
listed in the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum, by an individual’s year of first university degree
attainment and by the degree-granting university’s eventual denomination (smoothed using an
11-year moving average). Occupations are classified into economic sectors using the Thesaurus
Professionum (Marburg University, 2015).
in column 2 we control for longitude-varying linear time trends. One can see that these controls
do not affect our findings. Because newly formed universities might respond differently to the
economic, social, and political changes accompanying the Reformation (and because many of the
youngest universities in our sample were Protestant), in column 3 we control for university foun-
dation date-varying linear time trends. Again, our results are unaffected. Finally, in column 4,
we control for both longitude-varying linear time trends and university foundation date-varying
linear time trends, again without significantly affecting our results.
We next broaden our analysis to study selection into first jobs in the entire “church sector”—
not only monks. As discussed above, one might expect that greater uncertainty of employment in
the church sector and greater demand for skilled labor by secular authorities would shift skilled
labor toward secular occupations after 1517, particularly in Protestant territories.
In Figure 9, we plot the share of first jobs by sector—church and secular—by year, separately
for universities that would adopt Protestantism and for those that would remain Catholic. One
can see in the figure that in both types of universities, shares of jobs in the church and secular sec-
tors converged on an even 50-50 split at the time of the Reformation. After the Reformation, the
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patterns of occupational sorting look distinctly different, with a very clear break in trend toward
secular sector first jobs among graduates of Protestant universities, and a slower, smoother con-
tinuation of the pre-existing trend toward secular first jobs in Catholic universities. Thus, looking
across church- and secular-sector first jobs, we see a shift toward secular sector first jobs after the
Reformation, specifically among graduates of Protestant universities.
We can again subject our graphical findings to a more careful regression analysis. In Table 4
replicate the specifications of Table 3, but instead studying selection into any first job in the church
sector. One can see that the broad patterns observed for selection into first jobs as monks hold true
for more general church-sector employment. Prior to the Reformation, we do not see evidence
of differential patterns of first job sector of employment between graduates of universities that
would become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic. Coefficient estimates on the
interactions between the dummy variable for Protestant universities and decade fixed effects are
variable in sign and quite small prior to 1520. After the Reformation, each interaction coefficient
is negative, all around 0.10–0.15, and typically borderline statistically significant. The sum of the
post-Reformation coefficients is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% or 10% level
across specifications. Broadly, there is a shift away from church-sector first jobs among Protestant
university graduates after the Reformation.
4.3 Investment in Church-specific versus general human capital
An implication of the reduced employment prospects in the church sector is that forward-looking
students should invest less in human capital that specifically has a high payoff in the church sec-
tor, and shift their investments toward more general human capital. In fact, while highly-skilled
individuals entered church employment from a range of educational backgrounds, there was a
particular human capital investment that was essentially church specific: the study of theology.
As can be seen in Table 5, while 60% of students in the RAG database with some career informa-
tion and without a theology degree had some church sector employment, this number jumps to
88% among individuals with a theology degree.
We thus examine whether there was not only a shift in employment from the church to the
secular sector among the highly skilled during the Reformation, but also a shift in the type of hu-
man capital acquired. In Figure 10, we present evidence that this was indeed the case, particularly
among students at Protestant universities (where we also observed the sharpest shift in occupa-
tions). One can see that prior to the Reformation, around 90% of degrees were awarded in secular
fields (art, law, and medicine), while around 10% were awarded in theology (if anything univer-
sities that would become Protestant granted slightly more theology degrees than universities that
would remain Catholic). After the Reformation, theology degrees granted fall nearly to zero in
Protestant universities. While theology degrees granted fall in Catholic universities as well in the
mid-16th century, by 1600, shares of theology degrees granted in Catholic universities are actually
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Table 4: The Effect of the Reformation on the Share of First Jobs in the Church
Sector
Dependent variable: Share of first jobs in the church sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protestant × 1470 -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Protestant × 1480 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Protestant × 1490 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Protestant × 1500 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Protestant × 1520 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Protestant × 1530 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Protestant × 1540 -0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
p-value: sum of 1520–1540 interactions 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.07
Longitude×time N Y N Y
Univ. foundation date×time N N Y Y
Table presents differential first occupational shares in church careers between grad-
uates from universities that would become Protestant and graduates from universi-
ties that would remain Catholic, by decade (i.e., interactions between an “eventually
protestant university” dummy variable and decade fixed effects). The omitted cate-
gory is Protestant×1510. The unit of observation is the university×decade. All re-
gressions weight by the number of degrees in a university×decade cell. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. All columns include decade and university fixed effects.
Column 2 controls for linear time trends that vary with the university’s longitude;
column 3 controls for university foundation date-varying linear time trends; and, col-
umn 4 controls for both longitude-varying linear time trends and university founda-
tion date-varying linear time trends. The bottom row of the table presents the p-value
from a test that the sum of the coefficients on the interactions between the Protestant
university dummy variable and 1520, 1530, and 1540 decade fixed effects equals zero.
Mean of the dependent variable (pre-Reformation): 0.59.
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Table 5: The Association Between the Study of Theology and Church-Sector Occupations
Type of university graduate No. of individuals Fraction with at least one church job
At least one theology degree 906 88%
No theology degree 4,901 60%
Table examines the relationship between theology study and careers in the church sec-
tor among individuals earning degrees between 1475 and 1550 and who have at least
one occupation recorded in the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum dataset. Careers in
the church sector are determined using the Thesaurus Professionum (Marburg University,
2015).
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Figure 10: Shares of theology and secular degrees granted by (eventual) university denomination
(smoothed using an 11-year moving average). Theology and secular degree categories are exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive. The secular degree category includes degrees in the arts, law, and
medicine. Data come from the Repertorium Academicum Germanicumfor degrees granted through
1550 and own data collection (consulting Bauch, 1897; Erler, 1895, 1897, 1909; Eulenburg, 1904;
Kleineidam, 1983; Leinweber, 1991; Ru¨egg, 1996; Steinmeyer, 1912) for degrees granted from 1550
through 1600.
26
greater than they were prior to the Reformation.29
We next test for the statistical significance of this divergence in human capital investments,
estimating the following model:
degree shareut = αu + δt + ∑
p=pre,post
βp(protu × periods) + eut. (3)
The model is very similar to our examination of occupation shares, but instead considers as its
outcome the share of degrees in theology among graduates of university u in decade t. Another
difference is that the explanatory variables of interest are interactions between an “eventually
Protestant university dummy” and time period (rather than decade) fixed effects.30 The time peri-
ods are 1520–1549, i.e., after the start of the Reformation; 1490–1519, the omitted, pre-Reformation
baseline period; and, 1470–1489, a “pre-baseline” period allowing us to test for differential pre-
Reformation trends in human capital investments between Protestant and Catholic universities.
Note that we aggregate decade-level data into longer, time-period-level tests in order to estimate
more precise differences in a context with university×decade cells with very few theology de-
grees.
In Table 6, column 1, we present the estimated coefficients on the interactions between the
“eventually Protestant university dummy” and time period fixed effects. One can see in the table
that even controlling for fixed university and decade differences, there is a marginally statistically
significant decline in the share of theology degrees in Protestant universities after 1520. One can
also see that there was no pre-Reformation difference in human capital investment trends between
universities that were eventually Protestant and those that would remain Catholic. In Table 6,
columns 2–4, we control for the time varying effects of university characteristics as we did in
Tables 3 and 4. We continue to see evidence of an economically meaningful divergence in human
capital investments after the Reformation: a differential fall in Protestant universities of around 5
percentage points relative to a pre-Reformation mean share of theology degrees of 11%. Thus, not
only did highly-skilled individuals shift their occupations in response to the Reformation, but they
also shifted their human capital investments away from church-sector-specific theology study and
toward more general human capital.
4.4 Construction activity
We view construction activity as approximating a summary statistic for the allocation of economic
resources given the requirements of land and financial, human, and physical capital. We begin our
analysis of construction activity across church and secular sectors by showing, in Figure 11, new
construction events per town per year by sector (church and secular are exhaustive and mutually
29Note that these patterns appear within degree levels as well: both examining only bachelor’s degrees, or examining
only advanced degrees.
30We do always control for decade and university fixed effects.
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Table 6: The Effect of the Reformation on the Share of Theology
Degrees
Dependent variable: Share of degrees in theology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protestant × Pre-1490 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Protestant × Post-1520 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 189 189 189 189
R2 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
Longitude×time N Y N Y
Univ. foundation date×time N N Y Y
Table presents differential degree shares in theology between
universities that would become Protestant and universities that
would remain Catholic, across three time periods: 1470–1489,
1490–1519, and 1520–1599. Differential shares are estimated
using interactions between an “eventually protestant univer-
sity” dummy variable and period fixed effects. The omit-
ted period is 1490–1519. The unit of observation is the
university×decade; all regressions weight by the number of de-
grees in a university×decade cell. All regressions control for uni-
versity and decade fixed effects. Column 2 controls for linear time
trends that vary with the university’s longitude; column 3 con-
trols for university foundation date-varying linear time trends;
and, column 4 controls for both longitude-varying linear time
trends and university foundation date-varying linear time trends.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Mean of the dependent
variable (pre-Reformation): 0.08.
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Figure 11: Construction starts per town×year disaggregated by sector for towns in (eventually)
Protestant and (remaining) Catholic territories (smoothed using an 11-year moving average).
Town-level construction data come from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Assignment of towns to reli-
gious denominations is done by matching each town to its territorial lord identified in the Euratlas
for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as coded by Cantoni (2012).
exclusive categories of construction). We show the time series of construction separately for towns
whose territorial lords eventually adopted Protestantism and for towns whose lords remained
Catholic. Note that the likelihood of a major construction event is small for a given town×year
observation: on average, German towns had one to two major construction events per century in
the early-modern era.
Several clear facts emerge from Figure 11. First, in both territories adopting Protestantism and
those that remained Catholic, church-sector construction predominated prior to the Reformation.
Second, in both “eventually Protestant” and “always Catholic” towns, secular construction in-
creased and church construction decreased just after Luther posted his 95 theses in 1517. Third,
the shift in resources was much greater and more sustained in regions that adopted Protestantism:
by the end of the 16th century, rates of new secular construction were nearly double rates of new
church construction in Protestant towns. In Catholic towns, in contrast, church and secular con-
struction were roughly equal at the end of the 16th century.
We next test whether the differences between Catholic and Protestant regions in secular and
church sector construction were statistically significant, examining secular and church sector con-
struction at the territory×decade level. We aggregate our town-level data into larger, territory-
level units in order to more precisely estimate differences in a context in which the vast majority
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of town×decade observations have zero construction events.
We estimate the following model:
constructionjt = αj + δt +
1590
∑
d=1470
βd(protj × decaded) + ejt, (4)
where constructionjt is a count of the construction events in territory j, in decade t; αj is a set of
territory fixed effects; δt is a set of decade fixed effects; and the explanatory variables of interest are
the interactions between an “eventually protestant territory” dummy variable and decade fixed
effects (1510–1519 is the omitted reference decade). Because of the presence of territory×decade
cells with zero total construction, rather than examine the share of total construction in the church
sector, we separately predict counts of construction events (constructionjt) in the church sector and
the secular sector.
In Table 7, column 1, we present the estimated coefficients on the interactions between the
“eventually Protestant territory” dummy and decade fixed effects in a model predicting church
construction events at the territory×decade level. One can see that prior to the 1520s, territo-
ries that would become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic did not follow different
trends in the level of church construction. In contrast, all of the eight post-Reformation interaction
terms indicate less church construction in Protestant territories than in Catholic territories (sig-
nificantly so in the decades following 1520, 1550, 1570, and 1580). We test whether the sum of
the post-Reformation coefficients is significantly different from zero, and in the second from the
bottom row of the table we present the p-value from this test. Indeed, we find an overall signifi-
cantly lower level of church sector construction in Protestant territories throughout the 1520–1600
period.
Because the 1520–1550 era was one of political instability and violent conflict (the Peasants’
War and the Schmalkaldic War), and because such political instability is particularly likely to affect
fixed capital investments like construction, we also test whether the sum of the post-Schmalkaldic
War coefficients is significantly different from zero. In the bottom row of the table we present the
p-value from this test. One can see that in the 1550–1600 period of greater stability there remains
a significantly reduced level of church construction in Protestant territories compared to Catholic
ones.
In Table 7, column 2, we examine whether our results from column 1 were driven by dif-
ferences between Protestant and Catholic towns in the pre-existing level of construction activity
(though the absence of pre-1520 differences in trends is reassuring in that respect). We thus esti-
mate the same specification as in column 1, but control for the interaction between decade fixed
effects and the total amount of construction in a town between 1400 and 1470. One can see that
including these controls does not meaningfully affect our results.
We also consider the possibility that while the count of church building in Protestant territo-
ries shrank after the Reformation, perhaps church building sizes increased. We collect data on
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Table 7: The Effect of the Reformation on Construction Activity
Dependent variable: Number of construction events
Church Secular
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protestant × 1470 -1.08 -1.07 0.75 0.74
(0.78) (0.81) (0.61) (0.59)
Protestant × 1480 -1.38 -1.46 0.55 0.50
(1.00) (0.95) (0.42) (0.40)
Protestant × 1490 -0.56 -0.51 1.16 1.20
(0.75) (0.74) (0.57) (0.55)
Protestant × 1500 -0.34 -0.38 1.15 1.23
(0.69) (0.70) (0.41) (0.38)
Protestant × 1520 -2.08 -1.80 -0.01 -0.15
(0.85) (0.60) (0.66) (0.58)
Protestant × 1530 -0.94 -0.63 1.06 0.72
(0.90) (0.61) (1.16) (0.95)
Protestant × 1540 -1.44 -1.11 1.37 1.15
(1.08) (0.81) (0.92) (0.73)
Protestant × 1550 -2.39 -2.27 3.00 2.58
(0.97) (1.05) (1.33) (0.97)
Protestant × 1560 -1.18 -0.99 1.32 0.90
(0.84) (0.76) (1.23) (0.85)
Protestant × 1570 -1.75 -1.59 2.46 2.06
(0.87) (0.83) (1.22) (0.87)
Protestant × 1580 -1.85 -1.82 2.25 1.83
(0.79) (0.83) (1.19) (0.79)
Protestant × 1590 -1.21 -1.14 1.30 1.02
(1.01) (1.10) (1.12) (0.92)
Observations 455 455 455 455
R2 0.73 0.79 0.71 0.80
p-value: sum of 1520–1590 interactions 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.03
p-value: sum of 1550–1590 interactions 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.02
1400–1470 constr.×decade FE N Y N Y
Table presents differential numbers of construction events, by sector, compar-
ing territories that would become Protestant and territories that would remain
Catholic across decades (i.e., examining interactions between an “eventually
protestant territory” dummy variable and decade fixed effects). The omitted
category is Protestant×1510. The unit of observation is the territory×decade,
with the outcome variable calculated as the sum of construction events in a
territory×decade for a particular sector. The sectors are: church, in columns 1
and 2 and secular, in columns 3 and 4. All specifications include territory and
decade fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include interactions between the total
number of construction events in a territory between 1400 and 1470 and decade
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the territory level in parentheses (35
clusters). Means of the dependent variable (pre-Reformation): 3.10 (Church),
1.36 (secular).
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church sizes from the 124-volume series Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dellwing,
1988/2011) and its various predecessor series,31 which provides us with information on the area
of 14% of the new church buildings we observe in eventually-Protestant territories between 1470
and 1600. We find that church areas increased slightly, but statistically insignificantly from the
pre-Reformation era to the post-Reformation era: from around 450 square meters to around 495 in
the sample of churches for which we have data (see Online Appendix Table A4).
The decline in church construction during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant territo-
ries, raises the question of whether there was there resource destruction or rather reallocation to
other types of constructions. In Table 7, columns 3 and 4, we estimate the same specifications as
in columns 1 and 2, but examine secular sector construction by town× decade. One can see in the
table that there are were broadly similar trends of secular construction in eventually Protestant ter-
ritories and territories that would remain Catholic prior to the Reformation. If anything, there is a
slight relative decline in secular construction in (eventually) Protestant territories in 1510 (as seen
in the positive, significant coefficients on the 1490 and 1500 interactions). During the Reformation,
and particularly during the relative stability of the post-Schmalkaldic War era (1550–1600) one can
see a significant relative increase in secular construction in the Protestant territories. That is, there
was significant reallocation of resources away from construction activity for church purposes and
toward construction for secular purposes.
A basic question about the pattern we observe is whether our results reflect a mis-categorization
of construction events. For certain categories of construction the distinction between religious and
secular may be ambiguous or even improper. For example, schools and hospitals may have been
attached to churches and were staffed by church personnel. To address this question, we exploit
the highly disaggregated nature of our underlying construction data. Figure 12 presents evidence
on secular construction by purpose for Protestant territories and shows that the post-Reformation
increase predominantly comes from the construction of new administrative buildings and lords’
palaces. This evidence indicates that the overall pattern of secularization is not driven ambiguous
categories of construction and is driven by reallocation in precisely the categories that our politi-
cal economy framework predicts: buildings reflecting the increased power and wealth of secular
authorities. This evidence also reveals that the reallocation is not driven by military expenditures
that might appear secular but serve religious purposes.
4.5 The causal effects of the Reformation
One might wonder whether the reallocation we observe reflects a causal effect of the Reformation
or merely the effects of unobserved differences across territories. Perhaps territories that became
Protestant were already economically or culturally different prior to the Reformation, with this
underlying difference driving both the Reformation and the economic secularization we docu-
31A full set of references is provided in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 12: Cumulative number of new secular sector construction events, disaggregated by spe-
cific purpose, for towns in (eventually) Protestant territories. Town-level construction data come
from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Assignment of towns to religious denominations is done by match-
ing each town to its territorial lord identified in the Euratlas for 1500, and using the territorial
lord’s religion as coded by Cantoni (2012).
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Figure 13: Construction starts per city×year or town×year disaggregated by sector for cities and
towns in (eventually) Protestant and (remaining) Catholic territories (smoothed using an 11-year
moving average). Town-level construction data come from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Assignment
of towns to religious denominations is done by matching each town to its territorial lord identi-
fied in the Euratlas for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as coded by Cantoni (2012).
“Cities” for the purpose of this figure are the subset of towns in the dataset with population data
available in Bairoch et al. (1988); “towns” for the purpose of this figure are the complementary
subset.
ment. Evidence presented thus far supports a causal interpretation: territories and universities
that would become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic exhibit no significant differ-
ences in human and physical capital investment prior to the Reformation. We observe no indica-
tion that these territories would have diverged had the Reformation not occurred.
One might remain concerned about time-varying, territory-specific unobservables that drove
both the adoption of Protestantism and economic secularization. A large literature documents a
wave of urban support for the Reformation across Germany and that cities (as opposed to towns)
were the locations where reformist ideas and constituencies developed (Ozment, 1975; Hamm,
1994).32 However, our findings are not driven by large cities. In Figure 13, one can see a pattern of
reallocation from church to secular construction in both small Protestant towns and large Protes-
32As Brady (2009, p. 161) observes, “cities became the nurseries and schoolhouses of religious change, it is hardly
going too far to say that the Protestant reformation was, at least in its youth, ‘an urban event’.”
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tant cities. In the online Appendix, we replicate Table 7 restricting the analysis to small towns and
we find nearly identical results (see Online Appendix Table A3).
A final concern could be that economic shocks hit particular regions, shifting the both like-
lihood of the adoption Protestantism and the incentives for economic secularization. To explore
this possibility, we narrow our focus to three territories where the timing of religious change was
unrelated to local economic conditions. To be precise, we study three settings in which the timing
of religious change was driven by the exogenous timing of of ruler change. We examine evidence
on the change of rulers and religion in the Electorate of Brandenburg, the Duchy of Saxony, and
the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg. In these three territories, an unobserved territory-by-time economic
shock does not explain the timing of the adoption of Protestant, but we observe the same pattern of
economic secularization coinciding with religious change that we observe throughout Germany.
Electorate of Brandenburg — The Electorate of Brandenburg at the time of the Reformation was
ruled by Joachim I (Nestor), who, with his brother Albert, personified the corrupt practices that
Luther criticized in his theses. In particular, Joachim I and his Hohenzollern family purchased
the archbishopric of Mainz for Albert using loans guaranteed by future sales of indulgences. A
staunch Catholic, Joachim I had his son, Joachim II (Hector) sign an inheritance contract in which
Joachim II promised to remain Catholic. One can see in the top panel of Figure 14 that during
the period of Catholic rule (until the death of Joachim I, in 1535), the Electorate of Brandenburg
experienced very few monastery closures and saw very little increase in secular construction.
However, after the death of Joachim I in 1535, Joachim II reneged on his pledge to remain
Catholic. In the top panel of Figure 14, one can see that shortly after Joachim II took power, the
political shock produced a sharp increase in monastery closure, and, as measured by construction
activity, a shift of resources toward secular and away from church uses.
Duchy of Saxony — The Duchy of Saxony was ruled in the early 16th century by Duke Georg, an
ardent Catholic. In 1539, Georg’s last remaining (Catholic) son, Frederick died. Knowing that his
Protestant brother Heinrich was in line to inherit the Duchy if he died, Georg attempted to secure
the inheritance for the Catholic Ferdinand (who would eventually become Holy Roman Emperor).
Georg initiated the legal process necessary to transfer his inheritance Ferdinand; however, before
this could be completed, Georg himself died in 1539, leading to the accession of Heinrich and the
conversion of the Duchy to Lutheranism.
In the middle panel of Figure 14, one can see some monastery closure and some shift in con-
struction away from the church sector during the Reformation era even under the Catholic Georg.
However, at precisely the moment when the Protestant Heinrich took power (marked by a ver-
tical red line), monastery closure sharply accelerated, and resources were allocated differentially
toward secular and away from church uses.
Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg — In 1519, Duke Ulrich was exiled from the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg after
killing the husband of his mistress. Control of the Duchy was given to the Catholic future emperor
Ferdinand. In 1523, Ulrich adopted the Protestant faith and attempted to retake the Duchy on the
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Figure 14: Monastery closure and construction in three territories: Brandenburg, Ducal Saxony,
and Wu¨rttemberg. Each figure shows the fraction of monasteries closed and the number of con-
struction events in the church and secular sectors (construction events are shown as 11-year mov-
ing averages). The posting of Luther’s theses in 1517 and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 are
marked in all figures, as are the dates of each change in territorial lord leading to the adoption of
Protestantism: 1535 for Electorate of Brandenburg, 1539 for the Duchy of Saxony, and 1534 for the
Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg.
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back of the Peasants’ Revolt, but this attempt failed. One can see in the bottom panel of Figure 14
that in the first decade after the Reformation, under the Catholic Frederick, there is almost no
monastery closure in the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg, and very little shifting of construction toward
secular purposes.
But in 1534, supported by his friend, the Protestant Philip of Hesse, the Duchy was restored
to Ulrich. Immediately thereafter, Ulrich expropriated many of the Duchy’s monasteries; by 1535,
one-third of the Duchy’s farmland was transferred from the monasteries into Ulrich’s possession
(Ocker, 2010, pp. 55–56). One can see in the botton panel of Figure 14 that exactly at this time
secular construction begins to rise and overtakes religious construction in the Duchy.
5 Conclusion
Religious organizations have been among the most economically important institutions in human
societies throughout history (Finer, 1999). These organizations historically have accumulated fi-
nancial capital, possessed land, attracted human capital, and ruled regions. Shocks to the market
for religion thus have the potential to affect the underlying structure of economies. We find that
the Protestant Reformation marked both a challenge to the incumbent monopolist in the market
for religion and a broader economic shock. Not only did the Reformation result in a decline in the
economic power of Europe’s most powerful institution at the time—the Catholic Church—it also
produced a sharp shift in the allocation of economic resources toward secular uses.
Secular lords exploited the ideological shock to the Catholic Church to confiscate monastery
resources. Highly skilled labor moved from church careers toward secular careers, including in
expanding secular administrations, particularly in regions that adopted the Protestant religion.
Consistent with economic theory, university students, anticipating lower and more uncertain re-
turns to church-career-specific training in theology, began to accumulate more general human
capital, studying the arts, law, and medicine. The shift in resources toward secular activity was
made tangible in the new construction occurring in 16th century Germany, which shifted sharply
toward secular purposes, particularly in Protestant regions.
While the Reformation’s effects would reverberate across Europe for centuries, and the culmi-
nation of Europe’s cultural secularization was centuries away, our findings suggest that the first
steps toward the rise of a secular West were taken immediately after the Reformation, with the
weakening of the Catholic Church and the strengthening of the secular state.
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Figure A1: Number of theology and secular degrees granted. Figure shows the number of degrees
in theology and in secular subjects by year, and an 11-year moving average. Theology and secular
degree categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The secular degree category includes
degrees in the arts, law, and medicine. Data come from the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum
for degrees granted through 1550 and own data collection (consulting Bauch, 1897; Erler, 1895,
1897, 1909; Eulenburg, 1904; Kleineidam, 1983; Leinweber, 1991; Ru¨egg, 1996; Steinmeyer, 1912)
for degrees granted from 1550 through 1600. This figure differs from Figure 4 in that data are not
smoothed across the 1550 breaking point between sources.
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Table A1: Degrees awarded by level and subject
Subject Bachelor’s License Master’s Doctor Total
Arts 17608 4163 15179 450 37400
Law 1210 892 1 896 2999
Medicine 239 211 7 486 943
Theology 2085 767 38 898 3788
Across subject total 21142 6033 15225 2730 45130
Data come from the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum.
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Table A2: Territories and assignment to (eventual) religion
Territory Protestant Territory Protestant
Anhalt 1537 Lorraine —
Baden 1555 Mainz —
Bavaria-Landshut — Mecklenburg 1549
Bavaria-Munich — Nassau 1542
Bohemia — Palatinate 1546
Brandenburg 1539 Passau —
Brunswick-Calenberg 1584 Poland —
Brunswick-Lu¨neburg 1529 Pomerania 1534
Brunswick-Wolfenbu¨ttel 1568 Ruppin 1539
Burgundian Netherlands — Salzburg —
Cleves-Mark — Saxony (Ducal) 1539
Cologne — Saxony (Electorate) 1527
Denmark 1536 Small States of the HRE .
East Frisia 1535 Swiss Confederacy .
Guelders — Trier —
Habsburg Monarchy — Upper Palatinate 1546
Hesse 1526 Wu¨rttemberg 1534
Ju¨lich-Berg —
Table lists territories present in the Euratlas (Nu¨ssli, 2008) for 1500, and their
assignment to the territorial lord’s (eventual) religion through the dates of
introduction of the Reformation as in Cantoni (2012). Note: Cities matched
by the Euratlas digital maps to “Small States of the HRE” and to the “Swiss
Confederacy” are discarded in our analysis. Territories, and their names, re-
flect borders as of 1500: Bavaria-Landshut and Bavaria-Munich, e.g., merge
after the War of the Succession of Landshut (1503–1505).
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Table A3: The Effect of the Reformation on Construction Activity Outside Large
Cities
Dependent variable: Number of construction events
Church Secular
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Protestant × 1470 -1.10 -0.94 0.57 0.56
(0.77) (0.80) (0.35) (0.39)
Protestant × 1480 -1.54∗∗ -1.56∗∗ 0.84∗ 0.77∗
(0.75) (0.73) (0.41) (0.40)
Protestant × 1490 -0.89 -0.75 0.88∗ 0.92∗
(0.58) (0.55) (0.48) (0.51)
Protestant × 1500 -0.79 -0.76 0.86∗∗ 0.92∗∗
(0.50) (0.50) (0.40) (0.42)
Protestant × 1520 -1.73∗∗ -1.39∗∗∗ 0.29 0.10
(0.72) (0.44) (0.56) (0.46)
Protestant × 1530 -1.40∗∗ -1.08∗∗ 0.98 0.58
(0.66) (0.41) (0.89) (0.66)
Protestant × 1540 -1.50∗ -1.12∗ 0.92 0.76
(0.83) (0.56) (0.56) (0.46)
Protestant × 1550 -2.54∗∗∗ -2.33∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗ 2.00∗∗
(0.74) (0.73) (1.06) (0.76)
Protestant × 1560 -1.57∗∗ -1.38∗∗ 1.39 0.99∗
(0.65) (0.61) (0.86) (0.58)
Protestant × 1570 -1.98∗∗∗ -1.80∗∗∗ 1.67 1.21
(0.66) (0.63) (1.01) (0.75)
Protestant × 1580 -1.58∗∗ -1.54∗∗ 1.58 1.10
(0.61) (0.69) (0.98) (0.66)
Protestant × 1590 -1.30 -1.29 0.97 0.63
(0.87) (0.98) (0.87) (0.68)
Observations 455 455 455 455
R2 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.78
P-value: sum of 1520–1590 interactions 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.05
P-value: sum of 1550–1590 interactions 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05
1400–1470 constr.×decade FE N Y N Y
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table presents differential numbers of construction
events, by sector, comparing territories that would become Protestant and territories
that would remain Catholic across decades (i.e., examining interactions between an
“eventually protestant territory” dummy variable and decade fixed effects). Sample
is limited to towns in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch too small to be included in the popula-
tion data collected in Bairoch et al. (1988). The omitted category is Protestant×1510.
The unit of observation is the territory×decade, with the outcome variable calculated
as the sum of construction events in a territory×decade for a particular sector. The
sectors are: church, in columns 1 and 2 and secular, in columns 3 and 4. All specifica-
tions include territory and decade fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include interactions
between the total number of construction events in a territory between 1400 and 1470
and decade fixed effects.Standard errors clustered at the territory level in parentheses
(35 clusters).
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Table A4: The Size of Church Construction Projects in Protestant Territories
Pre: 1470-1517 Post: 1518-1600 p-value
n Mean SD n Mean SD diff. in means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All New Church Construction
Indicator: Church Size Recorded 125 0.18 0.38 88 0.08 0.27 0.03
Where Church Size is Recorded
Church Size in Square Meters 22 453.24 302.43 7 494.93 196.42 0.68
This table presents summary statistics on physical sizes of new churches built in German territories that ulti-
mately adopted Protestantism. We study new church construction in cities and towns recorded over the period
1470–1600 in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. We obtain data on church sizes by finding each new church in the 124-
volume series Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dellwing, 1988/2011), which provides a record of
cultural monuments in Germany. The first row provides summary statistics for the binary outcome indicat-
ing whether a given church construction event mentioned in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch is recorded with original
floor dimensions in the Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1 = ‘yes’, 0 = ‘no’). The second row pro-
vides summary statistics on church sizes for construction events on which the Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik
Deutschland provides information on the original size of church buildings. Church sizes are measured in square
meters, calculated as the sum of the church nave area and church choir area, using data on floor plan widths and
lengths.
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